The relative low level of smart home system (SHS) device information security may threaten the privacy of users. In this paper, we propose a homomorphic consortium blockchain for SHS sensitive data privacy preserving (HCB-SDPP), which is based on the traditional smart home system. We add verification services, which are composed of verification nodes, to our model to verify working nodes and transactions in SHS. In order to record the SHS device information transaction, we propose a new block data structure based on homomorphic encryption (HEBDS). Using the HCB-SDPP model, we design an encrypted algorithm based on Paillier encrypted for privacy protection. To verify the validity of the HCB-SDPP model, we firstly encrypt sensitive data of all gateway peers and upload them to the consortium blockchain. Then, we validate the security of sensitive data after homomorphic encryption processing. In the experiment, we also design attack experiments to attack different types of peers on the consortium blockchain in the HCB-SDPP model. If these nodes are insecure, the influence on the whole model will be analyzed. The simulation result shows that the HCB-SDPP model can protect customer privacy more effectively than SHS.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development and integration of the computer technology, the communication technology, and the Internet technology, the Internet of Things (IoT) [1] applications have been found in many fields [2] . IoT technology not only changes people's daily life [3] , [4] , but also creates new ''ecological'' environments [5] . IoT uses technologies like radio frequency identification technology, wireless communication technology, etc. to make real-time global information shared. In short, IoT involves interconnecting everything around us [6] . Things in IoT are smart devices that have the capability to ''decide'' the target to communicate (D2D) and to make computation. Data communication between devices in the IoT has always been a research hotspot [7] . Typical application of IoT can be found in the smart home
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The growth of smart devices has greatly increased the volume of individual health information, which is transmitted and stored by mobile phones, tablets, wireless sensors and wearable health devices in SHS [10] .
If a large amount of personal information was hacked, it could cause a great influence harm to the whole society. Therefore, the network security of IoT in SHS has attracted the attention of many researchers. In [11] , an SH-IoT architecture was provided to enable the interaction (communication) among various devices, and the possible risk for information security was explored under various scenarios. Reference [12] provided a solution to network-level security of SHS in the future. Such a flow-based monitoring in [9] can not only achieve most of the security advantages based on packet monitoring, but also reduce processing costs. In [13] , Mehdi Nobakht et al. proposed an IoT-IDM framework that provided network-level protection for smart devices deployed at home and monitored the malicious network activity. Healthcare devices in SHS generally record sensitive information such as blood pressure [14] , heart rate [15] , respiratory rate [16] . Therefore, in order to prevent sensitive data from being hacked, the security of network data is particularly important. Although the existing SHS can protect the privacy of users in some way, there are still some potential risks about information security. The above literatures have all adopt the central transaction data processing structure. These sensitive and privacy data of users are stored and processed centrally. If the centralized database system is attacked and the data is leaked, security and privacy of transaction data are difficult to guarantee.
The emergence of blockchain [17] - [19] and smart contract [20] , [21] provided a new way for the protection and privacy of SHS. It is another type of cryptography system that integrates a consensus mechanism, distributed data storage, point-to-point transmission and encryption algorithms [22] . Now the technology continues to find novel applications in numerous areas such as digital asset transactions, equity clearing, cross-border payment, secure document storage and notarization. In [23] , Madhusudan Singh et al. provided a blockchain network for IoT architecture and a distributed data share architecture. This literature discusses the combination of Blockchain technology and IoT environment, then puts forward the idea that blockchain is a solution of IoT security. In [24] , Pascal Urien et al. provided a BIoT paradigm whose main idea was to insert sensor data in blockchain transactions, this literature uses BIoT paradigm to implement publication/duplication of sensor data in public and distributed ledgers, data authentication and non repudiation of data. Reference [25] constructed a trustworthy trading platform for IoT ecosystems by combining blockchain and IoT. It solves the trust problem in the ecosystem of IoT and the traceability problem of IoT equipment and related data. In [25] , Bin Yu et al. proposed a solution using a local peer network to bridge the gap to address the problem of combining blockchain with IoT. The solution provides a way to resolve the difficulty of implementing blockchain point-to-point network on IoT devices which is caused by resource constraints. It also solves the problem that the current blockchain is hard to handle the speed of transaction generation due to the large number of devices in IoT. Therefore, summarize the above literatures, the problems in the privacy security and privacy protection of data from IoT can be solved through combining blockchain and IoT technologies. The anonymity of blockchain technology makes it impossible for one to match an account of others even if the user can see all transaction records about an account. The information of blockchain is highly transparent and tamper-resistant, which can effectively reduce the risk of privacy leakage. The emergence of Change [26] and CoinJoin [27] provided a safe and effective tool for data privacy. However, the Consortium Blockchain serves as a kind of blockchain framework. While containing the characteristics of blockchain, the Consortium Blockchain architecture will be more suitable for the fields that focus on privacy protection, transaction speed and internal supervision. The Consortium Blockchain realizes the blockchain technology to provide new support for the security and privacy protection of SHS based on the IoT architecture.
This paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II, we introduce the concept of SHS, Consortium Blockchain and homomorphic encryption Paillier. Section III discusses the modified SHS and the HCB-SDPP model, then we design a new block data structure HEBDS of the latter. In Section IV, we present a deep analysis of examples result; to evaluate the data security of our model, Section V performs attack experiments and conducts comparative analysis to verify the characteristics for protecting privacy data of the HCB-SDPP model.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. SMART HOME SYSTEM Traditional SHS [28] takes the residences as one platform to inherit or control various furniture devices and forms an intelligent system that integrates the structure, service, system and management. Fig. 1 shows the architecture of a traditional SHS and that architecture can be divided into three layers: application layer, network layer and sensory layer. The application layer mainly accesses, analyzes, processes data and issues control commands. That is, users can access mobile terminals through the GSM/GPRS/Internet/WIFI network. The sensory layer mainly collects data generated by real-world devices. The network layer mainly involves the problems of control terminal in the application layer and intelligent sensor device in the perception layer to access the network and data transmission. The home gateway is the core of the SHS. It is the only way to connect the external network with the home network (local network). It allows devices to access GSM/GPRS/Internet/WIFI network, and to collect all kinds of communication data of sensors through ZigBee/Lora/Bluetooth/WIFI network.
B. CONSORTIUM BLOCKCHAIN
At present, the blockchain technology [29] can be divided into Public Blockchain, Consortium Blockchain and Private Blockchain. Because SHS demand for huge privacy data VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 2. Blockchain block structure.
security, as well as the system within the sensor attached to the terminal each residential distribution characteristics, we need to rely on the Consortium Blockchain that has the characteristic of multi-blockchain structure, high scalability, high interoperability, and its system can be implemented more organizational governance, members of the cooperative Consortium Blockchain. The Consortium Blockchain can help us to provide new support for SHS security and privacy protection by taking advantages of the above characteristics of blockchain technology.
The multi-blockchain structure of Consortium Blockchain refers to multiple blockchains formed by the nodes that controlled by different entities. Each blockchain runs multiple nodes. The data in the Consortium Blockchain only allows nodes in different blockchains to read, write and send transactions, all nodes in blockchain jointly record the transaction data. Data exchange between different blockchains can be implemented using methods such as channels in Fabric (one of the Consortium Blockchain project). The construction of Consortium Blockchain also follows a whole set of consensus and protocol mechanism. The consensus process is not required to involve all nodes in blockchain like public blockchain, but controlled by some pre-selected nodes with large weights. The distributed ledger and distributed consensus of Consortium Blockchain solve the trust problem of the interaction among multiple participants.
The data structure of the Consortium Blockchain is generally divided into two parts [30] : 1) the block header, which mainly contains the hash value of the previous block and is used to connect the previous block to ensure the integrity of the blockchain; 2) the block body, containing the main information of the block (transaction information), which together with the hash value of the previous blocks and random numbers constitute the hash value of the block. The data structure of Consortium Blockchain is shown in Fig. 2 .
Such this data structure enables the information of each block to be traced from the pre-selected nodes and to affect the information of the subsequent nodes. Its cryptographic method [31] ensures that malicious attacks cannot tamper with information, thus ensuring the security and integrity of data. For areas such as privacy protection, transaction speed and internal regulation, the Consortium Blockchain structure is more appropriate.
C. HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY
Homomorphic encryption [32] , [33] is a form of encryption, which allows people to make specific algebraic operations on ciphertext to obtain still encrypted results. The result obtained by decryption is the same as that obtained by the same operation on plaintext. In other words, the technology allows people to perform operations such as retrieval, comparison and other operations in the encrypted data to get the correct results without having to decrypt the data in the whole process. The significance lies in the fundamental solution to the problem of confidentiality when data and its operation are entrusted to a third party, such as for various cloud computing applications.
Paillier encryption is a kind of homomorphic encryption [34] . This encryption system is the first additive homomorphic encryption cryptosystem based on the determination of composite residual problems. It was proposed by the scholar Paillier in 1999, and its security is based on the determination of composite residual problems. The additive homomorphism can not only process ciphertext data quickly, but also meet the high security requirement [35] . This means that, given only the public key and the encryption of m 1 and m 2 , you can calculate the encryption of m 1 + m 2 . The Paillier algorithm can be divided into the following steps:
Step 1. Key Generation from Paillier Function.
1)Randomly choose two large prime numbers p and q, if and only if, for ∀p, q ∈ DPN , where DPN is a large prime, and we get: gcd
Step 4. Analysis of homomorphism
For ∀m 1 , m 2 ∈ Z n , encrypted by the Encrypt function, we will get:
III. SMS PRIVACY PROTECTION AND SECURITY SHARING MODEL
In this section, we will propose the HCB-SDPP model. First of all, we introduce the overall structure involved in the HCB-SDPP model in Sec. III-A. We add the idea of channel from Fabric in model and describe the topology of the whole model. In Sec. III-B, we construct a new block data structure. In Sec. III-C and Sec. III-D, we design the distributed consensus method, homomorphic data decryption of the model, the key generation, and update methods of the model. The working process of the model is given in Sec. III-E.
A. THE MODEL ARCHITECTURE
As shown in the top half of Fig. 3 , different from the usual SHS [36] and to better manage its members and encrypt sensitive data within SHS, we consider adding verify nodes v i into SHS and using homomorphic encryption to encrypt and protect sensitive data in SHS. We create a connection between the v i and the smart gateway nodes g i that has added in SHS through backhaul link. First of all, the v i will generate the node key pair and the homomorphic encryption key pair, and v i will distribute the secret keys to all g i that connect with v i . At the same time, sensor nodes s i gather users' sensitive data in real time, and upload integrated data to the associated smart gateway g i through cellular link; g i collects all users' sensitive data uploaded by s i in transmission range. Then g i will use the node key and the homomorphic encryption key to encrypt sensitive data. Finally, the privacy sensitive data encryption protection is realized.
As shown in the lower part of Fig. 3 , we map the new smart home system network into homomorphic Consortium Blockchain. There are four main types of nodes in the homomorphic Consortium Blockchain: smart gateway nodes, leader smart gateway node, verification nodes and leader verification node. The p G i is the smart gateway node, we integrated p G i from one common community into a common organization, and create one channel to make p G i from one common organization to joined in. Through this channel, all joined p G i will store the collected sensor sensitive data by consensus.
The p V i is the verification node, all p V i constitute members of the certification service. p V i provides digital certificate-based identity information to members of the homomorphic Consortium Blockchain community (Each p G i and the organization in the communication range is a consortium), and can generate or cancel a member's identity certificate. On the basis of clear membership, the organization can implement the management of authority control. p V i is served by the pre-selected p G i . It is mainly responsible for processing the smart contract, checking the legality of transaction data, and updating and maintaining the node data and the account status in blockchain organization. In particular, the generation of each block is determined by all pre-selected nodes and stored in homomorphic Consortium Blockchain.
The Sp G i is the leader smart gateway node and is also the anchor smart gateway node, because all nodes in blockchain are anonymous, they do not know the node information of each other. When the nodes outside blockchain need to communicate with the nodes inside blockchain, they need to elect a leader smart gateway node Sp G i and communicate with the outside through this node. The Sp G i can also be found by the external nodes as an anchor node. The Sp V i is the leader verification node and is also the anchor verification node. 
Therefore, based on characteristics of modified SHS, the overall structure of the modified SHS can be mapped into the homomorphic Consortium Blockchain, we propose the homomorphic Consortium Blockchain for SHS sensitive data privacy preserving (HCB-SDPP). The HCB-SDPP model is formalized as follows:
Definition 1: HCB-SDPP is a 11-tuple.
(S, G, V , P, C, GK , HK , δ, ψ, σ, ω)
where: 1) S = {s i |i ∈ N + } is the finite set of sensor node s i in the SHS.
2) G = {g i |i ∈ N + } is the finite set of smart gateway node g i in the SHS.
3) V = {v i |i ∈ N + } is the finite set of verification node v i . smart gateway node and is also the anchor smart gateway node. P V = {p V i |i ∈ N + } is the finite set of verification role p V i in Consortium Blockchain. Sp V i is the leader verification node and is also the anchor verification node.
} is the finite set of node public key, GK S = {gk S i |i ∈ N + } is the finite set of node private key.
} is the finite set of homomorphic encryption public key, HK S = {hk S i |i ∈ N + } is the finite set of homomorphic encryption private key. 8) δ : P → C is the mapping from the finite set of Consortium Blockchain nodes P to the finite set of channel C. 9) ψ : G → P G is the mapping from the finite set of smart gateway node G in SHS to the finite set of smart gateway node P G in Consortium Blockchain. 10) σ : V → P V is the mapping from the finite set of verification node V to the finite set of verification node P V in Consortium Blockchain. 11) ω : GK S → G is the mapping from the finite set of node private key GK S to the finite set of smart gateway node G.
B. THE BLOCKCHAIN DATA STRUCTURE OF HCB-SDPP
Different from the structure of data blocks in usual Consortium Blockchain, sensitive data need to be protected in HCB-SDPP. Therefore, this paper proposes a new block data structure based on Homomorphic Encryption (HEBDS), its structure is shown in Fig. 4 . Compared with transaction data recorded by other Consortium Blockchain, the HEBDS proposed in this paper mainly records sensitive data of users, such as blood pressure, heart rate and breathing rate in personal health data, or power consumption and idle time in status data of smart devices.
The difference between HEBDS and other Consortium Blockchain block data structures is that, at some point t, is private and sensitive data, it only visible to users, such as blood pressure and heart rate in personal health data, or power consumption in status data of smart devices. For data in msg SD i , it needs to be homomorphic encrypted with the homomorphic encryption public key hk P t related to the current time t. Then, the HEBDS uses the private key gk S i assigned to g i to sign the entire data of msg i (crypt j -crypt k in Fig. 4) , and hash the signed data (Hash1-Hash4 in Fig. 4) . Finally, the HEBDS generates a unique merkle root to write into the block header.
C. DISTRIBUTED CONSENSUS METHOD AND HOMOMORPHIC DATA DECRYPTION
When data in HEBDS needs to be computed (such as accumulated or statistically), the verification node set V in the HCB-SDPP model take a distributed consensus to decide whether to respond to the request:
Take the calculation of household electricity consumption in the same community as an example.
Step 1. The leader smart gateway node Sp G i can obtain the homomorphic ''electricity consumption'' value in all blocks of this G channel chain, and calculate the total electricity consumption quantity (ciphertext state) by means of homomorphic accumulation method.
Step 2. After electricity consumption quantity (ciphertext state) is exchanged through V-G channel and received by the anchor node (the leader verification node Sp V i ) of V channel, a transaction is initiated (translate the homomorphic ciphertext into plaintext). This transaction needs to be verified by all verification nodes p V i . After the verification is passed, the accounting nodes will translate it. The translation process will be carried out through the homomorphic encryption private key corresponding to the corresponding timestamp of the given data. If there are multiple groups of data in different time stages, the chain code will search for the corresponding homomorphic encryption private key in different time stages. After that the chain code will decrypt the data and then summarize them.
D. KEY GENERATION AND UPDATA METHODS
When sensitive data in HEBDS needs to be encrypted, the homomorphic encryption key and the node key will be updated periodically.
When nodes in V channel conduct consensus, the p V i that obtain the bookkeeping right are selected by the PoW. These p V i are responsible for generating key pairs equal to the number of nodes in G channel. Through V-G channel and the leader smart gateway node Sp G i , the Sp V i will give each p G i in G channel a private key (directly replace), and will write the public key of this key pair group into the block of V channel.
In addition, the p V i that obtain the bookkeeping right will generate a pair of homomorphic encryption keys. The homomorphic private key should be recorded in the block of V channel, and the homomorphic public key should be published to G channel as a special transaction through the two anchor nodes on both channels and V-G channel.
E. THE WORKING PROCESS of MODEL
In order to describe the working process of the entire model more clearly, we briefly describe it, the HCB-SDPP model working process as follows:
Step 1. The formation of HCB-SDPP main chain and genesis block. In HCB-SDPP, multiple pre-selected nodes are selected according to the PoW consensus algorithm as the bookkeeping nodes of the whole network from p G i and p V i . These pre-selected nodes as bookkeeper, and the generation of each block is decided by all of them. (pre-selected nodes participate in the consensus process). In HCB-SDPP, in order to achieve information transmission, storage and query among multiple same nodes, we create V channel and G channel. We add all p V i into the V channel and add p G i from the same organization (community) into their respective G channel. The V channel is established before the G channel. The first transaction in HCB-SDPP is agreed by all bookkeeping nodes and written into a block, which is the creation block in HCB-SDPP and the first block in main chain of HCB-SDPP.
Step 2. Allocate the node key and the homomorphic encryption key. Firstly, HK and GK are generated by the p V i that obtain the bookkeeping right nodes in the V channel. These nodes save hk S i and gk P i into the block of the V channel. At the same time, they transmit hk P t and gk S i through V-G channel to G channel, G channel distributes gk S i to each p G i . And hk P t is treated as a special transaction, the corresponding bookkeeping node in G channel should record the homomorphic public key in the block.
Step 3. Publish the signed packet. When a certain smart network node p G i collects the information sent by sensor nodes, it will be processed as a ''transaction'': firstly, the data will be homomorphic encrypted (such as Paillier), and then the homomorphic encrypted data will be packaged into data package (DP), and the DP will be signed by gk S i . In this formula, d is the serial number of the DP. Finally, DP is published to the network by p G i .
Step 4. Produce block. All p G i select the bookkeeping nodes of the whole network according to PoW consensus algorithm, and the bookkeeping nodes write the all information in a period of time into block header in the form of Merkle tree, and they store ParentHash, Coinbase, TimeStamp, Merkle tree root, Number, Nonce and other parameters in block body. Among them, ParentHash and Nonce need to be calculated based on the parameters of the previous block such as nonce and hash value. Finally, they pack block header and block body into a new block which is linked at the end of main chain. These correct blocks are sequentially linked in time stamp to form a chain data structure, which ultimately forms a blockchain.
Step 5. Data query or summary. When the chain code running on a node needs to query or summarize the data in G channel, this node should join in G channel to obtain chain block data of the channel firstly, and then perform homomorphic calculation to obtain the ciphertext of statistical result.
IV. SIMULATION EXPERIMENT AND ANALYSIS
In usual SHS, sensitive privacy information collected by smart home devices often has the problems of weak non-anonymity, the risk of privacy leakage in the process of calculation and storage. To solve this problem, we carried out simulation experiment on HCB-SDPP model. We successfully deployed the HyperLedger Fabric 1.2.0 environment with multiple machines and nodes under the Ubuntu 16.04 operating system, we manually used configuration files to create multiple channels (V channel, G channel and V-G channel) and multiple nodes, and we added the corresponding nodes into the corresponding channels. With the above methods, we construct HCB-SDPP model. The contents of simulation are as follows: There are about 100 gateway nodes p G i in community, and due to the limited computational force in simulated experimental environment, we randomly selected 50 gateway nodes p G i for the simulation experiment. Each users' personal health data or status data of smart devices are uploaded to the smart gateway node p G i . Each p G i collects three types of SHS private sensitive data: heart rate (HR), blood pressure (BP) and respiratory rate (RR). The plaintext of users' privacy data collected by each p G i is shown in TABLE 1. In HCB-SDPP model, we create two channels, G channel and V channel, and we add these 50 p G i to G channel, the verification nodes p V i are all added in V channel. The HCB-SDPP model will use its own characteristics of the Consortium Blockchain architecture and the method of homomorphic encryption to encrypt and protect the users' privacy sensitive data. The data processed by p G i is encrypted into the form of to all p G i . The p G i with the permission of p V i in the same G channel and in the Consortium Blockchain can consult the statistics of these users' sensitive privacy data through the authorized hk P t and gk S i at any time, and it can also trace and accumulate the historical data along the blockchain. However, since the signature of p G i private key gk S i is added in the data preprocessing, any node cannot pry into the private data of other nodes before obtaining the p V i permission.
V. ATTACK EXPERIMENT AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS A. ATTACK EXPERIMENTATION AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we will design an attack experiment. There are many gateway nodes in the community, and each users' personal health data or status data of smart devices is uploaded to the corresponding smart gateway node. The HCB-SDPP is used for managing these data uniformly. In the practical application of the HCB-SDPP model, the verification node p V i in V channel, periodically generates a pair of homomorphic encryption keys and n pairs of node keys. The homomorphic encryption private key hk S i and the n node public keys gk P i are stored in the blockchain of V channel, and the homomorphic encryption public key hk P i and the n node private keys gk S i are distributed to the smart gateway node p G i in G channel. In G channel, the smart gateway node p G i periodically encrypts the smart home sensitive data with the homomorphic encryption public key hk P i and the n node private keys gk S i . These data and the hk P i are stored in the blockchain of G channel. The Sp G i and Sp V i are selected periodically and automatically. When the HCB-SDPP model is made into use, it will be attacked by malicious nodes or malicious programs. When the HCB-SDPP model is under network attack, and different types of nodes in the model are attacked and become insecure nodes, we analyze the influence of these insecure nodes on the entire model network and on the household privacy data stored in it. Here we analyze 8 cases of attacks: Exp.1 Assume that p G 3 is Sp G i , and it is attacked as an insecure node. The following data will be leaked: 1. the homomorphic encryption public key hk P i and the n node private keys gk S i distributed by Sp V i ; 2. all of the current n transaction sets which are smart home sensitive data encrypted and signed by homomorphic encryption; 3. the statistical and verifiable historical transaction data, which are all ciphertext. In this case, the attack has no effect on the sensitive smart home data protected in this model.
Exp.2 Assume that p G
3 is not Sp G i , and it is attacked as an insecure node. The following data will be leaked: 1. the smart home terminal information collected by p G 3 itself; 2. the previous block information, which records previously encrypted smart home sensitive data that cannot be decrypted. In this case, the attack has no effect on the sensitive smart home data protected in this model.
Exp.3 Assume that p V
2 is Sp V i , and it is attacked as an insecure node. The following data will be leaked: 1. the homomorphic encryption public key hk P i and the n node private keys gk S i distributed by Sp V i ; 2. the authenticated homomorphic encrypted data that Sp G i requests; 3. with the key leaked by Sp V i , data on the Sp G i can also be decrypted and obtained, but these data are the result data of homomorphic encryption, and the sensitive data on the other p G i will not be leaked; 4. the data stored on the blockchain from time 0 to time n − 1 in the past (the homomorphic encryption private key hk S i and the n node public keys gk P i ). However, Sp V i cannot initiate a request to query the content of the previous data block in G channel blockchain. In this case, the attack has no effect on the sensitive smart home data protected in this model. Exp. 4 Assume that p V 2 is not Sp V i , and it is attacked as an insecure node. The following data will be leaked: the previous homomorphic encryption private key hk S i and the n node public keys gk P i . In this case, the attack has no effect on the sensitive smart home data protected in this model.
Exp.5 Assume that
, and they are all attacked as insecure nodes at the same time. Combining the experiment results of Exp 2 and Exp 4, the following data will be leaked: 1. the smart home terminal information collected by p G 3 itself; 2. the previous encrypted block information in G channel blockchain and the previous he homomorphic encryption private key hk S i and the n node public keys gk P i in V channel blockchain. However, the p V 2 cannot initiate a request to query the content of the previous data block in G channel blockchain. In this case, the attack has no effect on the sensitive smart home data protected in this model. Exp. 6 Assume that p G 3 is not Sp G i , p V 2 is Sp V i , and they are all attacked as insecure nodes at the same time. Combining the experiment results of Exp 2 and Exp 3, the following data will be leaked: 1. except the pair of homomorphic encryption key and n pairs of node key generated by the current cycle; 2. the previous encrypted block information in G channel blockchain; 3. the previous homomorphic encryption private key hk S i and the n node public keys gk P i in V channel blockchain; 4. the smart home terminal information collected by p G 3 itself and the previous encrypted block information in G channel blockchain are also leaked. However, these data are encrypted. In this case, the attack has no effect on the sensitive smart home data protected in this model.
Exp.7 Assume that
, and they are all attacked as insecure nodes at the same time. Combining the experiment results of Exp 1 and Exp 4, the following data will be leaked: 1. the all encrypted block information in G channel blockchain; 2. the homomorphic encryption public key hk P i and the n node private keys gk S i of current period; 3. all key data in V channel blockchain. However, these available data are also encrypted. In this case, the attack has no effect on the sensitive smart home data protected in this model.
, and they are all attacked as insecure nodes at the same time. Combining the experiment results of Exp 1 and Exp 3, by using the homomorphic encryption key and the node keys of all time periods (the intruder will use other means of communication in the network to enable p G 3 and p V 2 to communicate and transmit the important key), all encrypted block information and all the encrypted smart home sensitive data in G channel blockchain can be decrypted. However, the probability of this situation is extremely low. The reason is that, on the premise of the security protection of blockchain itself, the HCB-SDPP will carry out stricter supervision on all verification nodes p V i and V channel. In this case, the attack has very weak influence on the sensitive smart home data protected in this model. Based on the discussion above, once the model is attacked, resulting in the nodes being captured and becoming insecure, different keys will be disclosed under different attack conditions. What's worse, these insecure nodes can pose a threat to other normal nodes. There is a certain probability for insecure nodes to obtain privacy and sensitive data on other nodes and G channel blockchain. According to above analysis of Exp 1-8, insecure nodes are serious threats to normal nodes safety. Users' data obtained by insecure nodes are now summarized in TABLE 5 , in which the attacked set of nodes in design Exp 1-8 are highlighted by underscores.
B. MODEL PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the performance of the HCB-SDPP from five aspects based on the attack experiments.
1) DATA SECURITY
In the experiment, the smart gateway p G i performs Paillier encryption, and private key signature on the collected local source data. Then it forwards them in the form of ciphertext packets in blockchain network. If the key is intercepted during distribution, it is difficult for an external network attack to obtain p G i privacy information, because it cannot pass the verification of verification node p V i . However, for an intranet attack, such as when p G i is captured by a malicious program, there are two situations: 1) if it is an ordinary p G i , privacy information cannot be obtained because the original p G i cannot be obtained; 2) if it is a p V i , the consensus of p V i set must be completed before it can be obtained. According to the Byzantine consensus mechanism, this consensus needs to be supported by more than 2/3 of the nodes, meaning that an attack must conquer 2/3 of p V i , which is almost impossible in terms of probability. Therefore, the method in this paper can largely guarantee the security of data.
2) DATA AVAILABILITY This paper uses HEBDS structure for block organization. Since Consortium Blockchain technology has the characteristics of tamper-proof, permanent, decentralized and open, each p G i can obtain this permanent database by synchronizing the chain block after the block is formed. Among them, PD data can be directly obtained and calculated from the chain block. The SD data involving privacy can be counted, accumulated and other homomorphic calculations. Corresponding results can be obtained after authorization without damaging the privacy of data set.
3) COMPUTABILITY AND SHARABILITY
In the above experiments, all kinds of privacy data processed by Paillier algorithm are distinguished according to different families and different indicators. The encrypted result set is refined to the index level in terms of data granularity, which can be used to select subsets for nodes that need data processing and calculation, or to conduct statistical calculation according to different purposes. Since ciphertext data does not involve personal privacy, sharing, copying and distribution of data will not affect the disclosure of privacy.
4) SYSTEM ROBUSTNESS
As the model is supported by the Consortium Blockchain technology, when one node fails, other nodes will not be affected. Single point failure is avoided by spreading the workload to the network. In addition, the decentralized storage, non-tampering, strong timing and public verification features of Consortium Blockchain enable each p G i to participate in calculation and verification process of the whole system. This improves the computational power of the system, and also enhances the robustness of the system
5) STORAGE SECURITY
The HCB-SDPP creates G channel among the various smart gateway p G i , and p G i join G channel. A common ledger in G channel constitutes a blockchain, which is maintained by all p G i that join G channel. The information collected by the smart gateway node p G i is packaged into blocks and stored in this blockchain. The p G i added to G channel can query and access the data, and the nodes outside G channel cannot do anything with the data inside it.
Verification nodes are mainly responsible for the management (distribution, revocation, etc.) of all certificates in HCB-SDPP network, and provide identity information based on digital certificates to all nodes in the network. The verification nodes can generate or cancel identity certificate of the member node. On the basis of the clear identity of the member node, addition of p V i service can realize the management function of authority control for HCB-SDPP model, allowing new nodes to join the organization or allowing new nodes or organizations to join the network.
In addition, the block header part of the HEBDS adds an information compared with the original blockchain pk b . This information mainly records public key used by the block in DT Paillier encryption, so that the real information can be viewed later. This method of first encrypting and then hashing enhances the protection of privacy data and further prevents the disclosure of privacy data.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we constructed a modified SHS model. Based on this model, we mapped this model to the consortium blockchain architecture. We also proposed the HCB-SDPP model. By performing Paillier encryption on the users' personal health data or status data of smart devices, privacy protection was provided for the modified SHS under the Consortium Blockchain framework. We verified the effectiveness of this scheme by analysis of simulation results, and the security of the scheme by performing attack experiments and analysis. However, there is still a need for considerable further research in this area. For example, the smart contract in the HCB-SDPP model needs to be further extended to meet the higher requirements of the more prevalent SHS. In the future, we will do more in-depth research on these aspects. 
